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1. Introduction 
One of the fundamental and empirically most controversial economic questions is 
whether private firms perform better than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and whether 
privatization improves firm performance. There is now a large literature on the subject and the 
issue has gained currency as large-scale privatizations have taken place in many countries of the 
former Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia, and as countries such as China and India consider similar, 
large transformations. 
Interestingly, while privatization is based on the premise that it will improve corporate 
performance and help countries grow, the effect has been surprisingly hard to identify. At the 
macro level, one observes that some of the fastest growing transition economies (e.g., China, 
Poland and Slovenia) have been among the slowest to privatize, while some of the fastest 
privatizers (e.g., Russia, Ukraine and the Czech Republic) experienced a decline or slow growth 
after privatization in the 1990s. In a cross-country aggregate study, Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat 
(2000) find that privatization does not by itself increase GDP growth, but they suggest that a 
positive effect is present when privatization is accompanied by in-depth institutional reforms. 
Careful micro-econometric studies date back to Caves and Christensen’s (1980) classic study 
that found the private and state-owned Canadian railways performing equally efficiently in a 
head-on competition. Recent surveys of privatization studies based on micro data come up with 
assessments that range from finding a large variation of outcomes but no systematically 
significant effect of privatization on performance (Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer, 1999), to 
cautiously concluding that privatization around the world improves firm performance 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001), to being fairly confident  that privatization tends to improve 
performance (Shirley and Walsh, 2000, and Djankov and Murrell, 2000). 
In part, the variation in results is brought about by the fact that different studies have 
access to different, and often very limited, data on firm ownership. For these reasons, most William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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studies treat ownership as a relatively simple categorical concept (e.g., private v. state or state v. 
foreign, domestic private outsider v. domestic private insider), and they are unable to distinguish 
the exact extent of ownership by individual owners or even relatively homogeneous groups of 
owners.
1 As we discuss below, the inability to distinguish the extent of different forms of 
ownership also prevents many studies from providing evidence on a lively theoretical debate 
about the desirability of concentrated v. dispersed ownership on corporate performance.
2 
Equally important, the diversity of findings is generated by three types of analytical 
problems that may be expected in early studies, especially those in the context of the rapidly 
changing transition economies. First, these studies often  mix data from different accounting 
systems and many are not able to distinguish accurately differences in ownership as privatization 
was still ongoing during the period under study (see Filer and Hanousek, 2002). Second, the 
early studies use small and unrepresentative samples of firms and they rely on a short period of 
time with observations concentrated immediately before and/or after privatization.
3 They  may 
hence produce biased estimates and they  capture only the short–term effects of privatization, 
namely those associated with defensive (reactive) restructuring of firms.
4 However, as we 
discuss in Section 2, the early ownership patterns were often unstable, frequent ownership 
changes were hard to detect, and temporary owners did not necessarily engage in restructuring. 
The estimates of the immediate post-privatization effects may hence not reflect the true medium 
and long-term effects of a switch from state to a relatively stable f orm of private or mixed 
                                                                 
1 See for example Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1997), Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997), Claessens 
and Djankov (1999), and Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000). 
2 An important recent exception is Grossfeld and Tressel (2001). 
3 For example, Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) use a 1990-93 sample of about 200 firms pooled 
from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) use a sample of 
260-340 Russian shops during the 1992-93 period; Bilsen and Konings (1998) use survey data for 1990–94 on about 
260 firms divided among Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary; Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) use a sample of 173 of the 
largest 500 companies in Poland during the 1988-1994 period; and Claessens and Djankov (1999) use data on 
approximately 700 manufacturing firms from the Czech Republic during 1993-97. 
4 See Grosfeld and Roland (1997) and Aghion and Carlin (1996) for discussions of the defensive and reactive 
restructuring. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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ownership. Third, a selection bias may be a serious problem in that many studies estimate the 
performance effect of privatization by comparing the post-privatization performance of 
privatized firms to the performance of the remaining state-owned firms. Yet, Gupta, Ham and 
Svejnar’s (2000) econometric evidence indicates that better performing firms tend to be 
privatized first. Since many studies are unable to control adequately for selectivity, they may 
erroneously attribute the inherently superior performance of the privatized firms to privatization. 
In this paper, we advance the literature by estimating the performance effects of key 
ownership patterns that we construct from detailed information on the extent of firm ownership 
by various owners. In particular, we exploit the fact that, unlike other authors, we are able to 
identify individual firms and obtain detailed information about their ownership and key 
indicators of performance. We are hence able to estimate the effects of different ownership forms 
and degrees of ownership concentration that are deemed important by theorists, policy makers, 
businessmen, and analysts, but the effects of which have not been examined fully in existing 
studies. 
Moreover, we advance the literature by  systematically striving to overcome the three 
types of above-mentioned problems found in existing studies. In particular, we (a) use panel data 
on a virtually complete population of medium and large firms that were privatized in a model 
large-scale privatization economy (Czech Republic) and that constitute the bulk of the country’s 
economic activity,
5 (b) cover a four-year period after privatization, when accounting rules 
conforming to the international (IAP) standard were already enforced, (c) control for selectivity, 
                                                                 
5 The Central European economies have served as models for other transition countries in that early on they carried 
out important reforms and policy makers from other countries and international institutions such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund have used them as examples to follow. In this context, the Czech Republic has 
served as the example of rapid, large scale privatization, while Hungary has been the example of piece-meal 
privatization of individual firms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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and (d) capture the effects after the large-scale privatization and immediate post-large scale 
privatization changes of ownership took place.
6 
In addition, the fact that we use data from an economy that started almost completely 
state owned and within a short time span underwent large-scale privatization means that we are 
analyzing a population of firms that experienced one of the greatest changes in ownership 
recorded throughout the world. Unlike studies of partial privatization, we hence benefit from 
large variation in the variables whose effect we analyze. 
Finally, by carrying out a detailed study on one model economy, we are able to take into 
account specific legal and institutional features that relate to ownership and control, and avoid 
the problem of controlling adequately for complex cross-country differences in the institutional 
and legal frameworks that plague comparative studies with limited number of country-specific 
observations.
7 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section  2 we provide information on the 
privatization process that generates our data, while in Section 3 we discuss the relevant features 
of the legal system and the hypothesized implications of different types of ownership on firm 
performance. In Section 4 we describe the data and basic statistics and in Section 5 we outline 
our empirical strategy. We present our empirical estimates in Section 6 and we draw conclusions 
in Section 7. 
                                                                 
6 The present paper belongs to a second generation of empirical studies that are being carried out to analyze 
corporate performance in the post-privatization period and employ large samples or populations of firm-level data 
from specific types of privatization in a given country. These studies are being able to avoid some of the 
aforementioned problems and take into account specific institutional settings. Thus, Borenstein (2001) for instance 
examines the post-privatization restructuring of former SOE, including examples from the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. Angelucci, Estrin, Konings and Zólkiewski (2001) use a large representative panel of manufacturing 
firms covering the years 1997-98 for Bulgaria and Romania, and 1994 and 1998 for Poland. Carlin, Fries, Schaffer 
and Seabright (2001) use an EBRD survey of 3,300 firms in 25 transition countries to identify the factors that 
influence restructuring by firms and their subsequent performance as measured by growth in sales and in sales per 
employee over a 1996-1998 period. Lizal and Svejnar (2002) use a 1992-98 panel data on the population of medium 
and large Czech industrial firms to examine investment behavior and the extent of credit rationing and soft budget 
constraints by ownership and corporate form of firms. 
7 Frydman et al’s. (1999) study for instance uses pooled cross-country regressions to derive its key findings. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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2. Privatization in the Czech Republic 
The privatization program in the Czech Republic was carried out in the first half of the 
1990s under three different schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale 
privatization. The first two schemes started in 1990 and were most important during the early 
years of the transition. Large-scale privatization, by far the most important scheme, began in 
1991 and was completed in early 1995.
8 The privatization program allowed various privatization 
techniques. Small firms were usually auctioned or sold in tenders. Many medium businesses 
were sold in tenders or to pre-determined buyers in direct sales. Most large and many medium 
firms were transformed into joint stock companies and their shares were distributed within 
voucher privatization (almost one-half of the total number of all shares of all joint stock 
companies was privatized in the voucher scheme), sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, 
or transferred to municipalities. 
The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process and it attracted 
considerable interest and publicity.
9 Two waves of voucher privatization took place in 1992-93 
and 1993-94, respectively. The early post-privatization ownership structure emerged as shares 
from the second wave were distributed in early 1995. Rapid reallocation of shares across new 
owners took place in 1995-96 during the so-called "third wave" of privatization as new owners, 
including the investment privatization funds (IPFs), reshaped their initial post-privatization 
portfolios of acquired companies. Depending on the investor, the swapping of shares in 1995-96 
was aimed at (a) optimal portfolio diversification, (b) obtaining concentrated ownership in 
                                                                 
8 The privatization process has been extensively described and analyzed. See e.g., Svejnar and Singer (1994), Kotrba 
(1995), Coffee (1996), and Kocenda (1999). 
9 The voucher scheme is sometimes erroneously referred to as the large-scale privatization program. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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specific firms and industries and (c) achieving conformity with legal requirements aimed at 
preventing excessive stakes being held by privatization funds.
10  
The 1995-96 ownership changes were massive, spontaneous and quite unregulated. 
Investors, especially the IPFs, engaged in direct swaps of large blocs of shares and off-market share 
trading was common.  More stable and, from t he standpoint of firm performance, more 
meaningful patterns of ownership emerged in 1996. We analyze the performance effects of 
various patterns of ownership and their changes after the dust of large-scale privatization and 
early post-privatization ownership swaps settled. 
3. Forms of Ownership and Hypothesized Effects on Performance  
Concentrated or Dispersed Ownership? 
The link between firm performance and ownership is often viewed as going through the 
interaction and power distribution between the owners and managers of firms. In this context, the 
issue that has received major renewed attention, without resulting in a consensus, is whether 
concentrated or dispersed ownership is more conducive to good corporate governance and 
performance. The literature that focuses on the agency problem arising from the separation of 
ownership and control usually argues for the desirability of concentrated ownership since it 
results in better monitoring of managers, maximization of shareholder value and availability of 
external finance for the firms (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, models that 
stress the importance of managerial initiative and incentives to acquire information (e.g., in 
situations of high uncertainty) conclude that concentrated ownership may be deleterious to firm  
                                                                 
10 The regulation of IPFs evolved gradually through Decree no. 383/1991, its Amendment No. 62/1992, and Act No. 
248/1992. The most important clauses restricted each privatization fund from investing more than 10% of points 
acquired in the voucher scheme in a single company and obtaining in exchange more than 20% of shares in any 
company. Privatization funds established by a single founder were allowed to accumulate up to 40% shares in a 
given company but this cap was later reduced to 20%. Many privatization funds circumvented the cap through 
mergers. The Act also prohibited IPFs founded by financial institutions from purchasing shares of other financial 
institutions to prevent excessive concentration of financial capital (see Kotrba and Svejnar, 1994). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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performance (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Dispersed ownership also results in greater 
liquidity of the company’s stock, which is viewed by some as improving the information value of 
the stock market and therefore enhancing the performance of firms (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1983). Ownership dispersion may hence be optimal, provided it can give rise to controlling 
stakes when managerial decisions need to be blocked and/or restructuring needs to be carried out 
(Bolton and von Thadden, 1998). 
Since we use data from firms that were listed on the Prague Stock Exchange and since we 
are able to identify all owners with ownership stakes of 10 percent or more, we can classify all 
firms into categories that allow us to test the validity of the competing predictions from the 
above theories. In particular, the Czech law provides important rights of ownership and control 
to owners with  majority ownership (more than 50 percent of shares),  blocking minority 
ownership (more than 33 percent but not more than 50 percent of shares) and legal minority 
ownership (at least 10 but not more than 33 percent of shares). Majority ownership grants the 
owner the right to staff management and supervisory boards, alter and/or transfer firms' assets 
and adopt most crucial strategic decisions at general shareholders' meeting. Through 
management and supervisory boards, majority ownership allows also more direct executive 
control over the company. 
The blocking minority ownership gives the right to block a number of decisions, such as 
those related to increasing or reducing assets and implementing major changes in business 
activities that the majority shareholder may strive to implement at the general shareholders' 
meeting. 
Finally, legal minority ownership is potentially important since the law entitles the holder 
of such a stake to call the general shareholders' meeting and obstruct its decisions by delaying 
their implementation through lengthy court proceedings. Effective legal minority shareholders William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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(including the state) may thus use their ownership position to delay or completely block the 
implementation of decisions by stronger shareholder(s). Another effect is observed in the case of 
portfolio companies that are primarily interested in capital gains. These companies have been 
observed to buy 10 percent positions in firms where they can sell the stake at a premium to the 
dominant shareholder whose business strategy is to avoid excessive scrutiny by an institutionally 
strong minority shareholder. 
We are also able to distinguish whether or not the government keeps a golden share that 
gives it the right to veto certain managerial decisions, such as subject of business activities, 
termination of provided services, sales of assets, etc. Institutional evidence suggests that the 
golden share may be an important mechanism enabling the state to exert a degree of influence 
over firms in which it no longer holds a sufficient ownership stake.
11 
Finally, note that we cannot trace ownership stakes of less than 10 percent since their 
reporting is not required by law. This limitation is not particularly constraining for our analysis 
for two reasons. First, ownership stakes below 10 percent do not provide the holder with 
substantial direct control over management or the firms' assets (see also Kocenda and Valachy, 
2002). Second, by having data on all owners with 10 percent or more ownership, we are able to 
estimate the effects of the most relevant degrees of dispersion of ownership, ranging from no 
owner having majority ownership, to no owner having the legal (10 percent) minority ownership. 
Types of Ownership 
Most empirical work about the impact of ownership has focused on government versus  
                                                                 
11 The golden share was introduced by Act No. 210/1993, modifying Act No. 92/1991. The act set the conditions for 
property transfer from the state to others with the aim of protecting special interests of the state in firms privatized in 
large privatization. The veto rights associated with the golden share usually relate to the scope and line of business 
activity and depend on each company’s charter. When the state sells its golden share, it gives up its rights in the 
company and the golden share cease to exist. The instrument of golden share in the Czech Republic does not 
conform fully to that found in other countries since it is limited to being solely an instrument of state control and 
does not serve as means of attracting free or less expensive credit. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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private ownership, domestic versus foreign ownership and ownership by insiders 
(managers and workers) versus outsiders. While useful as a first-order approximation, a finer 
division that reflects the patterns observed in the real world is needed to arrive at a clear 
understanding of the effects of ownership and corporate governance. Our analysis, based on six 
types of domestic and two types of foreign ownership, which are likely to have differing 
implications for objectives, constraints and other aspects of corporate governance, provides a 
step in this direction. 
The six domestic types of owners whose effect we analyze are industrial company, bank, 
investment fund, individual, portfolio company, and state, while the two types of foreign owners 
are industrial company and all other owners.
12 The ownership of a firm by an industrial company 
is normally expected to increase profitability through cost cutting, vertical or horizontal 
integration of activities, and possibly expansion aimed at exploiting economies of scale. 
However, in the incomplete legal and institutional framework of a transition, this proposition 
might not be empirically supported, especially if the parent company’s management appropriated 
the acquired company’s profits and assets (tunneling) or if it used the company for tax evasion or 
other private purposes. 
A bank’s ownership or credit exposure to a firm should also impose pressure on 
management to improve the firm’s profitability (Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer, 1996). However, 
the few, newly-created, large banks suddenly found themselves holding important credit and/or 
ownership positions in hundreds of firms and had only limited ability to staff the firms’ 
management and supervisory boards with capable individuals. Moreover, the banks’ ownership 
role was weakened by laws and a regulations that limited their authority and tolerated corruption 
                                                                 
12 Since insiders have not been important in the Czech Republic, we do not analyze this type of ownership. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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(see  Lízal and  Kocenda, 2001). The effect of bank ownership on performance is hence an 
empirical question. 
Investment funds are likely to emphasize on profit and, depending on their time horizon, 
they may also emphasize sound corporate governance. However, since the investment funds 
created in Czech privatization resemble mutual funds, one may expect them to focus on 
increasing the value of the stocks held in their portfolios rather than pursuing issues of corporate 
governance. Iskander and Chamlou (2000, p.75) critically point out that corporate governance in 
the funds themselves has been weak. While the funds have followed short-term value 
maximization strategies through building up strategic stakes in large companies and selling 
controlling blocks at premium prices, they  have often used the controlling stake to extract 
benefits from the company at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Individual ownership is widely perceived as an ideal form of corporate governance with 
the residual claimant having very strong incentives to monitor the management.  
The portfolio companies in the Czech Republic have tended to pursue short-term capital 
gains and they have normally not participated in corporate governance. While the experience in 
advanced market economies indicates that portfolio companies owning significant stakes often 
force management to become more profitable, it is not clear that this aspect of performance 
would be found in the post privatization period. 
The state as an owner may pursue various goals, including economic efficiency, tax 
revenues, or social goals such as employment. The results of Gupta et al. (2000) suggest that 
revenue maximization was important in the privatization phase, but other goals, such as 
employment generation, may be important in the post privatization phase when unemployment 
went up. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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Finally, in a country with favorable profit repatriation rules, foreign owners are likely to 
aim at generating profits and, if the local products can be sold through the worldwide network, 
also on increasing output and hence employment. 
4. The Data and Basic Statistics 
We perform our analysis on annual rates of change of four key performance variables: 
operating profit, sales revenue, labor cost, and liability/equity ratio (financial leverage). Our 
working data set  contains 2,529-2,949 of these annual rates of change observations on an 
unbalanced panel of 1,372-1,539 medium and large firms from all economic sectors. The exact 
number of observations and firms varies across the four performance indicators (see Table 1). 
The observations represent a cleaned data set from the entire population of firms that were listed 
on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) sometime in the 1996-1999 period. Thus, our data set 
contains firms that were listed on the PSE during the entire 1996-1999 period, as well those that 
started on the PSE sometime during 1996-1999 and later were de-listed. De-listing did not 
eliminate a firm from the sample and the sample size therefore does not diminish over time. 
Since virtually all large and medium-sized firms privatized in large scale privatization were 
listed on PSE, the data set contains most of these firms. In addition to performance variables, the 
data set contains detailed measures of ownership structure, sector in which the firm operates, and 
the firm’s privatization history. It was compiled by the authors from information provided by 
Aspekt, a commercial database, The Prague Stock Exchange, The National Property Fund of the 
Czech Republic, and the Business Register of the Czech Republic. 
As is known from empirical studies on transition and emerging market economies, firm-
level data often suffer from accounting deficiencies and they usually contain missing values and 
outlier observations that may bias the estimated coefficients (e.g., Filer and Hanousek, 2002). 
Firms operating in the Czech Republic started adopting international accounting (IAP) standards William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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in 1992 and our discussions with international accounting firms located in the country indicate 
that this process was by and large completed in 1995. Our 1996-99 data are hence from a period 
in which IAP already dominated local accounting standards. Moreover, the data are reported by 
firms that had to conform to the standards demanded in the second half of the 1990s by the main 
regulatory institutions, namely the Prague Stock Exchange, The National Property Fund (the 
privatization agency) of the Czech Republic and the Czech National Bank. The data are hence 
relatively reliable and free from the accounting deficiencies that plague earlier studies. 
We have adopted a three-step approach to handling missing observations and outliers in 
the original data set of 3040, 2648, 2972, and 3056 year-to-year, rate of change observations for 
profit, sales, labor cost, and financial leverage, respectively. First, we eliminated the few (rate of 
change) observations that were based on inconsistent values in the levels of variables, such as 
negative values of sales, labor cost, and financial leverage. This resulted in 3040, 2644, 2972, 
and 2923 observations for the rate of change of profit, sales, labor cost, and financial leverage, 
respectively. 
Second, since the data still contained a number of observations with fairly extreme 
values, we examined the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the trimming of these extreme 
values of variables, identifying points where the results became relatively insensitive to further 
trimming. We found that the estimates ceased being sensitive to trimming at the point where the 
year-to-year rate of change in the performance indicators was constrained to the wide interval of 
(-300%, 300%) for profit and (-100%, 300%) for the other three indicators.
13 Imposing these 
wide limits resulted in a relatively modest reduction in the number of observations for the rate of 
change in profit, sales, labor cost, and liability/equity ratio to 2529, 2592, 2949, and 2883, 
                                                                 
13 In contrast, the estimated coefficients change dramatically and non-monotonically as we add the outlying 
observations beyond this borderline to the sample. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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respectively. We have used Heckman’s (1979) procedure to correct for the possible sample 
selection bias brought about by the two-step data cleaning procedure.
14 
Third, we explored the possibility of creating a balanced data set with the same firm-year 
pairs across the four performance indicators. We found that this would require reducing the 
number of rate of change observations for profit, sales, labor cost, and financial leverage by 508 
(20%), 571 (22%), 928 (31.5%), and 862 (30%), respectively, resulting in a sample with 1199 
firms and 2021 observations. We have considered this further reduction in the number of 
observations to be excessively large. We have hence used the larger sample from step two above, 
but we have also generated Heckman-corrected estimates based on the balanced sub-sample for 
comparison. The findings based on the balanced sub-sample are broadly similar to those based 
on the larger sample. 
Overall, as may be seen from Table 1, within the four-year (1996-99) period we have on 
average data available for three consecutive years to compute annual rates of change of 
performance variables. In terms of the number of firms and observations, our sample is larger 
than samples used in previous and most ongoing studies in this area. We have also carried out a 
number of checks against official and private records to verify that our ownership information 
was reliable and that we hence met the criticism of earlier privatization studies raised by Filer 
and Hanousek (2002). 
As may be seen in Table 2, domestic industrial companies are the most frequent single 
largest owners (SLOs) with 1,102 observations, followed by domestic investment funds (493 
observations), domestic individuals (311) and the Czech state (211). Foreign industrial 
companies are by far the most frequent SLOs among the foreign investors (202 observations), 
                                                                 
14 In particular, using the original set of observations we first ran a Heckman-type probit equation, predicting the 
probability that a given observation is included in the subsample on the basis of the following variables: the initial 
values of the performance indicators and their squares and products, as well as dummy variables capturing the 
presence of a given firm in a particular privatization wave. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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and the total number of foreign SLO observations (258) is similar to the number of state and 
domestic individual SLOs. Ownership concentration, measured by the average stake held by a 
SLO, is between 31 and 56 percent, which is rather high in comparison to ownership 
concentration in developed countries (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). It resembles more the 
continental European than Anglo-American ownership concentration patterns (Brzica and Olson, 
2001). Finally, as may be seen in panel B of Table 2, foreign owners as a group tend to hold 
majority ownership stakes in firms. The situation is just the opposite for domestic private owners 
and the state, both of which have average stakes around 40 percent and display absolutely and 
relatively more cases of blocking as well as legal minority ownership than majority ownership. 
Moreover, the state retains a golden share primarily in firms in which it or domestic private 
owners are the SLO. Finally, there are 47 observations with highly dispersed ownership in the 
sense that no type of owner has even a legal (10 percent) minority ownership (not shown in 
Table 2).  
5. The Econometric Model 
  Our basic empirical specification represents a natural extension of the firm-specific fixed 
effects model used by Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999). In particular, let Xijt be a 
given performance indicator, with subscript i denoting individual firm under a certain type of 
ownership j, as defined in the previous section, and t denoting a time period (year). Moreover, let 
yijt be the percentage change of X from period t - 1 to period t, Pijt the ownership type of firm i in 
year t, and  Dct a vector of annual dummy variables. Frydman et al. (1999) estimate a firm-
specific fixed effects model of the form 
ijt ct ct j ijt i ijt D P y e d b a + + + =  ,            (1) 
where the rate of change of performance of a given firm is related to its ownership status and the 
annual dummy variables  Dct  that proxy for annual effects such as country-specific macro William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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shocks.
15 Using vector notation and suppressing subscript j for the sake of simplicity, the model 
may be rewritten as: 
t i i t i y , , e a + + + = ct i,t d d' p ß' .            (1’) 
The specification in equations (1) and (1’) assumes that the rate of change of firm’s performance 
depends only on its ownership status and annual macro shocks.
16 
We start with a basic model that relates the annual rate of change in firm’s performance, 
yi,t, to its ownership at the start of the previous period, pi,t-1, its initial level of performance after 
large-scale privatization has been completed,  Xi1, annual and industry/sector dummies, and 
dummy variables indicating whether the firm was privatized in the first or second wave of the 
voucher scheme or outside of it (all captured in the vector of dummy variables d): 
t i i t i X y , 1 , 0 , e g a + + + + = d d' p ß' 1 - i,t .            (2) 
Note that ownership pi,t-1 is lagged one period and that our data reflect both the initial (1996) 
post-privatization ownership and all subsequent ownership changes. Initial post-privatization 
level of performance, Xi1, refers to 1996 -- one year after large-scale privatization was officially 
concluded. Our specification in equation (2) thus controls for inter-firm differences in the initial 
post-privatization conditions, such as firm size, for industry-specific technological and other 
effects that may affect performance, and for differences between firms that were or were not part 
of the voucher scheme. As we discuss below, these variables control for potential selectivity as 
firms with different performance potential may have been channeled to different parts of the 
                                                                 
15 The model in equation (1) is developed in Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Heckman and Hotz (1989). 
16 Frydman et al. (1999) also estimate an ownership-group fixed effects model of the form 
ijt ct ct ijt j jit j ijt D X P y e d g b a + + + + = -1  where aj represents the fixed effect common to all firms i of 
ownership j. Note that the group fixed effects model does not control for firm heterogeneity within ownership 
groups and that it may yield biased estimates if this heterogeneity is present (e.g., if better firms within each group 
are privatized first, as indicated by Gupta et al., 2000). Note also that the model in equation (1) is not a direct 
extension of the group-specific fixed effects model to one based on firm-specific fixed effects since equation (1) 
omits Xijt-1. The estimates from the two models are hence not directly comparable. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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privatization program, which in turn may have affected their initial performance after 
privatization. 
Equation (2) may be viewed as coming from a framework such as the one invoked in the 
endogenous growth literature, where the rate of change of the dependent variable may depend on 
its initial level (e.g., rate of change of performance being related to an initial level of 
investment). Alternatively, the equation may be thought of as constituting the first difference of a 
logarithmic model of performance: 
( ) ( ) ( ) t i, i t i i t i ? t X t t t X + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + + = - d d' ß' 1 , 1 , 0 0 , ln g a a p ,        (3) 
where the logarithm of the level of performance, ln Xi,t, depends on firm-specific fixed effects 
and several  variables (ownership,  p, initial post-privatization performance,  Xi,1, and annual, 
industry and privatization wave dummies, d), whose effect on performance evolves linearly 
through time. Equation (2) then represents an approximation of the first difference of equation 
(3).
17 
An interesting feature of our data is that we are able to explore the effect of ownership 
forms in two key directions. First, we can examine whether majority, blocking minority and legal 
minority ownership of a particular type affects the firm’s post-privatization performance. We can 
also assess if the state can affect performance by retaining a golden share that gives it the right to 
block certain managerial decisions. Second, we can assess the performance effect associated with 
different types of single largest owners, and whether the SLOs have a majority, blocking 
minority, or legal minority stake. The ability to distinguish these ownership forms enables us to 
carry out the analysis to an important level of institutional detail that has not been achieved 
before. 
                                                                 
17 In particular, yit is approximated by  t i i t i t i X X X , 1 , 0 1 , , ln ln e g a + + + + = - - d d' p ß' 1 - t i,  which is our 
basic specification in equation (2), with ?i,t - ?i,t-1 = ei,t. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
  17 
Extent of Ownership 
As we discussed in Section 3, the analysis of the effect of majority and blocking minority 
ownership is important because these categories of ownership are widely believed to have major 
effects on corporate governance and performance of firms. Assessing the effect of legal minority 
is also important because it is an easier ownership stake to obtain and it carries important legal 
rights that may influence corporate governance and performance. 
Since the relative performance of state, domestic private and foreign ownership is one of 
the major issues in the privatization debate in the context of emerging as well as advanced 
market economies, we first focus our analysis on these three categories of ownership. In 
particular, we allow corporate performance to depend on whether private domestic owners as a 
group, foreign owners as a group, or the state have a majority, m, blocking minority, b, or legal 
minority, l, share ownership in the firm, and we also account for the effect of the state retaining a 
golden share, g: 
t i i t i t i t i X g s y , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , e g q y a + + + + + + + + = - - d d' l ' ? b ' ? m ' ? 4 1 - i,t 3 1 - i,t 2 1 - i,t 1 .  (4) 
  In equation (4), the dummy variables are coded so that the constant represents majority state 
ownership and the effect of other ownership forms is measured relative to this base. This is an 
intuitively appealing way to specify the equation since firms in which the state retains majority 
ownership and control are the ones that are the least privatized and on average probably also the 
least transformed. The dummy variable  s contains all other ownership patterns that do not 
involve a majority or blocking or legal minority stake in the firm. The specification in (4) thus 
allows us to distinguish firms that went from state ownership into a variety of ownership forms 
and to compare the performance effects of these ownership forms relative to the effect of state 
majority ownership. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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Another important issue that arises in the context of post-privatization behavior of firms 
is the dynamics of their restructuring and performance. The performance effect of short-term 
(defensive or reactive) restructuring is for instance often hypothesized to differ from the 
medium-term (strategic) restructuring associated with different forms of ownership (e.g., 
Blanchard, 1997, Roland, 2000). Moreover, strategic restructuring may take time to carry out and 
it may hence have a performance effect that varies over time. Blanchard (1997) has for example 
hypothesized that the effect of privatization would tend to have a U -shaped effect on 
employment and there may be a non-linear effect on other variables as well. Since there is no 
guidance for an exact functional form to capture the variation of the main effects over time, we 
use the first two terms of a second-order Taylor series expansion. Hence, we estimate a model 
that allows the effects of the various ownership forms described above to vary linearly and 
quadratically with time, where time is measured as the number of years since 1996: 
( ) ( ) + ￿ + ￿ + + + + = 1 - i,t 2 1 - i,t 1 1 - i,t 1 m ' t m ' t m ' ?
2
t i t t t t y
2
2 1 0 , a a a  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) + ￿ + ￿ + + ￿ + ￿ + + 1 - i,t 6 1 - i,t 5 1 - i,t 3 1 - i,t 4 1 - i,t 3 1 - i,t 2 l ' t l ' t l ' ? b ' t b ' t b ' ?
2 2 t t t t
  ( ) ( ) + ￿ + ￿ + + - 1 - i,t 8 1 - i,t 7 4 s t s t s
2
t i t t y 1 ,  
( ) ( ) t i i t i t i t i X g t g t g , 1 , 1 ,
2
10 1 , 9 1 , e g t t q + + + ￿ + ￿ + + - - - d d'       (5) 
The Single Largest Owner 
In the above analysis, we focus on the effects of majority and blocking or legal minority 
ownership, irrespective of how many different owners comprise the majority or minority groups. 
Highly concentrated and widely dispersed ownership levels of a given type are hence assumed to 
have the same effect on performance, a feature that may be too restrictive in view of the 
aforementioned theoretical controversy in this area. In the second prong of our analysis, we 
therefore focus on the effects of the single largest owner (SLO) and we exploit the fact that our William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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data permit us to distinguish among eight different types of SLOs as well as the extent of their 
ownership. 
The basic specification in this analysis is identical to that given in equation (2) above, 
with p being now a vector of eight different types of SLO. The corresponding specification for 
time-varying effects adds interaction terms of p with a linear and quadratic time trend: 
( ) ( ) t i i
2
t i X t t t t y , 1 ,
2
2 1 0 , e g a a a + + + ￿ + ￿ + + + + = d d' p ' ? p ' ? p ß' 1 - i,t 2 1 - i,t 1 1 - i,t .  (6) 
We next allow corporate performance to depend not only on the type of the SLO, p, but 
also on whether the SLO has a majority, 
* m , blocking minority, 
* b , or legal minority, 
* l , 
ownership of the firm, and whether the government has a golden share g. The specification that 
allows for these effects takes the form: 
t i i t i t i X g y , 1 , 1 , 4 0 , e g q a + + + + + + + + = -
* * * d d' l ' ? b ' ? m ' ? p ß' 1 - i,t 3 1 - i,t 2 1 - i,t 1 1 - i,t .  (7) 
Given that we have eight categories of SLOs, a specification that corresponds to (7) and 
includes an interaction with linear and quadratic time-varying effects is very extensive. 
Moreover, since many estimated coefficients in the more parsimonious models are insignificant, 
the extensive specification would likely generate mostly insignificant higher-order coefficients. 
We hence conclude our analysis by reporting the results of a fairly general yet simpler 
specification that nests equations (6) and (7) and allows us to assess the relative importance of 
interacting the various categories of SLO with time, versus allowing for the SLO to have a 
majority or blocking or legal minority status, and for the state to retain a golden share: 
( ) ( ) + ￿ + ￿ + + + + = 1 - i,t 2 1 - i,t 1 1 - i,t p ' ? p ' ? p ß'
2
t i t t t t y
2
2 1 0 , a a a  
t i i t i X g , 1 , 1 , 4 e g q + + + + + + + -
* * * d d' l ' ? b ' ? m ' ? 1 - i,t 3 1 - i,t 2 1 - i,t 1 .      (8) 
As mentioned earlier, since the firms in our sample were privatized in the large-scale 
privatization program, both within and outside the voucher scheme that occurred in two waves, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
  20 
they may display systematic heterogeneity since Gupta et al. (2000) found that better performing 
firms tended to be privatized in the first wave. Moreover, firms privatized earlier have a longer 
post-privatization period before we observe them in our data in 1996. To control for the potential 
selectivity bias stemming from these phenomena, we have included as regressors in the rates of 
change equations dummy variables indicating whether the firm was privatized in the first or 
second wave of the voucher scheme or outside of it (within large-scale privatization in general), 
the level of performance of the firm after large-scale privatization in 1996, and industry/sector 
dummy variables (vector d).
18 As it turns out, the estimated coefficients on the privatization 
dummy variables are insignificant in most the regressions. 
We have also employed the Kruskal-Wallis (1952) test to check for differences in the 
1996-99 variation of the performance variables of firms from the first and second wave of the 
voucher scheme, as well as the difference in each of these sets of firms and those privatized 
outside of the voucher scheme. The test is consistent with most of the regression findings in that 
it does not find the variation in the growth rates of variables for all three sub-samples to be 
different from one another. 
Finally, as to the method of estimation, we report estimates that are generated by the 
Huber (1967)-White (1982) (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) least squares, corrected for sample 
selection. 
6. Empirical Results 
  In Table 3 we present the estimated coefficients of the basic model given by equation 4, in 
which the rate of change in each performance indicator is related to dummy variables indicating 
whether domestic private owners, foreign owners or the state have a majority, blocking or legal 
                                                                 
18 When expressed as a model of the determinants of the level of firm performance, along the lines of equation (3), it 
is clear that the present specification controls for firm-specific fixed effects and allows the above dummy variables 
and the 1996 performance variable to control for systematic linear differences in post-privatization performance 
over time. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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minority ownership of the firm, and whether the state keeps a golden share in the firm. The 
constant reflects the 1996-97 rate of change in performance of firms that were privatized outside 
of the voucher scheme, in which the state retains majority ownership, and which operate in the 
miscellaneous (“other”) category of the 19 industries for which we control. The estimated 
coefficients on the various forms of ownership represent the average annual ownership effects 
relative to the effect of majority state ownership.
19 
As may be seen from Table 3, none of the categories of concentration of private domestic 
or foreign ownership generates an effect on the rate of change of sales revenue that differs from 
that of the majority state-owned firms. This is a provocative finding because it has been widely 
believed that domestic and foreign private ownerships, especially in greater intensities, lead to 
more substantial strategic restructuring and increases in sales -- domestically and/or on the world 
markets. We have checked the sensitivity of the result in Table 3 and we find that the results are 
robust except that majority foreign ownership generates an 11 percent positive effect on sales 
with additional trimming of about 10 percent of observations with the most extreme values of 
sales. 
Ownership effects are significant with respect to the three other performance variables. 
Majority and blocking minority domestic and foreign ownerships are associated with systematic  
                                                                 
19 Since our specification employs industry and annual dummy variables, and uses state majority ownership as part 
of the base that makes up the regression constant, it provides a convenient way to measure the average effects 
(across years and industries) of various forms of ownership, relative to the majority ownership by state. However, 
the specification does not lend itself to expressing in a simple way the average effect of state majority ownership 
since this effect varies across industries and years. To provide the reader with an estimate of the average effect of 
state majority ownership, we have therefore also estimated a more parsimonious model in which state majority 
ownership forms the constant and in which there are no annual, industry and privatization form dummy variables. In 
this model, the constant provides an estimate of the average effect of state majority ownership. These estimates 
show that the state as a majority owner is associated with a 5.9 and 11.4 annual percentage point growth of labor 
cost and financial leverage, respectively. It does not engender a significant change in profitability and sales. When 
the state is in a blocking minority position in a firm, it is associated with a 10.4 percent annual reduction in financial 
leverage. The state is also associated with an additional 4.1 and 5.3 percentage point increase in sales and labor cost, 
respectively, and 3.5 percentage point reduction of financial leverage in firms in which it has retained a golden 
share. The state hence demonstrates socially-oriented tendency in contributing to increasing labor costs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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27-37 percent (log point) increases in the annual rate of increase of profitability, relative to state 
majority ownership. There is also a 24 percent positive effect on profitability associated with 
legal minority domestic ownership and a 57 log point effect associated with highly dispersed 
(other than majority or minority) ownership.
20 These results hence suggest that moderately and 
highly concentrated private domestic and foreign forms of ownership increase firm profitability 
relative to all degrees of concentration of state ownership. However, highly dispersed ownership, 
with no owner having a 10 percent or higher stake, has the highest positive effect on profit. This 
finding provides support to the theories claiming that dispersed private ownership, giving 
autonomy to managers, is most beneficial for corporate performance.  
The positive effect of domestic majority and blocking minority ownership on profitability 
coincides with a negative 6 percent effect of these types of ownership on the rate of change of 
the labor cost. Firms with domestic majority and blocking minority owners hence restructure, at 
least in part, by reducing their labor cost – the only categories of owners to do so. The firms with 
foreign majority and blocking minority ownership display no effect on labor cost, and neither do 
firms in which domestic owners have a legal minority or firms with dispersed ownership. These 
firms presumably generate higher profitability by reducing non-labor costs and/or generating 
income from other sources than sales (e.g., rental income, dividends from stock ownership, inter-
enterprise credit, and, as we discuss presently, reduction in debt service). Finally, firms in which 
the state retains a golden share register a 5 percent increase in the annual rate of increase in labor 
costs, thus providing further evidence that the state pursues at least in part a social objective. 
Since the state retains golden shares primarily in state-owned and domestic private firms (Table 
                                                                 
20 For the sake of simplicity, in the text we report the logarithmic coefficients as percentage effects. This 
approximation is quite accurate for coefficient values between zero and about 0.3, but it is less accurate for higher 
values. For instance, the percentage effect corresponding to the coefficient of 0.57 (57 log points) is given by 
[exp(0.57)] – 1 = 77%. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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2), the effect of golden share moderates the tendency of firms with domestic majority and 
blocking minority ownership to reduce their labor cost. 
The regression on financial leverage shows that firms with majority, blocking minority 
and legal minority foreign ownership, as well as majority domestic owned firms, have a negative 
effect on the liability/equity ratio, relative to firms with majority state ownership and all other 
types of firms. 
The estimates in Table 3 have several interesting implications about the behavior of firms 
in the medium-term period after privatization. First, both private domestic and foreign majority 
and blocking minority owners increase profitability relative to majority state-owned firms. 
Domestic firms do so at least in part by reducing the rate of growth of labor cost. The foreign 
firms presumably do so by reducing non-labor costs or generating income from other areas than 
sales revenues, including possibly lower debt service payments. None of the nine types of firms 
(except for majority foreign owned firms in the additionally trimmed sample) succeed in 
increasing the scale of production as evidenced by the insignificant effects on sales. This 
suggests that the 0.8 percent average annual rate of increase in sales reported in Table 1 reflects 
fairly uniformly the behavior of all ownership categories of firms. Hence, rather than carrying 
out strategic restructuring characterized by increased profitability through greater production and 
sales, firms with all types of ownership appear to engage in defensive restructuring (reducing 
labor and presumably also non-labor costs) and generating income from other sources. The 
positive sales effect associated with majority foreign ownership in the more aggressively 
trimmed sample indicates that foreign owners in firms that do not show major changes in sales 
revenues are the only ones that restructure by expanding production in the post-privatization 
period. Since the positive sales effect in the additionally trimmed sample is not accompanied by 
a positive effect on labor costs, it appears to be associated with increased productive efficiency William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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or mark-ups. Finally, foreign owners with all intensities of ownership uniformly reduce financial 
leverage of firms that they own. Majority domestic ownership has the same effect. 
  The estimates in Table 4 correspond to equation (5) and they capture the dynamics of the 
ownership effects over time. The insignificant overall effect of all types of ownership on sales 
revenue, reported in Table 3, is found also in the time-varying-coefficient model in Table 4. The 
uniform sales effect of all ownership forms is hence persistent over time. It is also insensitive to 
further trimming of the sample. The strong overall effects of several forms of ownership on 
profitability, found in Table 3, are not detected in the more flexible specification of Table 4, 
which suffers from multicollinearity.
21 In contrast, we find a significant effect of the golden 
share on productivity. The effect is concave, rising first and declining later on. Finally, the 
insignificant overall effect of foreign legal minority ownership (Table 3) is found to be 
composed of a positive initial effect that declines over time. 
  The effect of ownership on labor cost varies strongly over time. Firms with majority and 
legal minority foreign ownership, blocking and legal minority domestic ownership, and golden 
share all display a U -shaped effect on labor cost over time. These owners hence engage in 
defensive restructuring in the first four years after privatization, but the effect withers away over 
time. These results are supportive of the assertion made by Blanchard (1997) that the effect of 
restructuring will have a U-shape over time.  
  Finally, the dynamic effect on the liability/equity ratio is initially negative and increasing 
linearly over time for majority and legal minority domestic ownership, as well as for dispersed 
(other than majority or minority) ownership and for the golden share. Majority state ownership is 
associated with a linearly declining financial leverage, and the overall negative effects of all 
                                                                 
21 The multicollinearity problem is also present in a linear time-varying-coefficient model. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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forms of foreign ownership, found in Table 3, are not observable in the flexible specification of 
Table 4.   
In Tables 5-7, we report the performance effects of a given owner being the single largest 
owner (SLO) of the firm. The estimates in Table 5 correspond to equation (2) and they show a 
positive effect on the annual rate of increase in profit when the SLO is a domestic industrial 
company (a 17 percent effect), domestic investment fund (a 17 percent effect), domestic 
individual owner (a 20 percent effect), and foreign industrial company (a 17 percent effect). 
Domestic bank and portfolio companies, as well as foreign “other” (i.e., non-industrial) company 
SLO do not have profit effects that are different from the effect of a state SLO. In the case of 
domestic industrial company and investment fund SLOs, the positive profit effect coincides with 
a reduction in the labor cost,
22 while the positive profit effect of the foreign industrial company 
SLO is concomitant with a positive effect on sales revenue and negative effect on leverage. The 
positive profit effect of an individual owner also coincides with a negative effect on leverage. 
Classifying ownership by the eight SLO categories therefore provides complementary 
results to the categorization by majority, blocking and legal minority and golden share 
ownership. The positive profit effect in Table 3 of majority and blocking minority domestic 
private ownership, associated with a reduction in the labor cost, is reflected in Table 5 in the 
behavior of domestic industrial companies and investment funds as SLOs. The positive profit 
effect among firms with majority and blocking minority foreign owners in Table 3 translates into 
the positive profit effect of the foreign industrial SLOs in Table 5.
23 The positive effect of 
foreign industrial companies on sales in Table 5 corresponds to the positive sales effect among 
the additionally trimmed sample reported on in the context of Table 3 above. A slightly weaker 
                                                                 
22 The domestic industrial company registers also a marginally significant negative effect on sales. Since the effect 
of this type of ownership on profit is positive, the negative sales effect seems to be dominated by the negative effect 
on labor cost and possibly also on non-labor cost or other than sales income. 
23 The foreign industrial SLOs constitute the majority of our foreign ownership observations (Table 2). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
  26 
correspondence is found for domestic individual SLOs that show a positive profit effect and a 
negative and almost conventionally significant effect on labor cost. It is possible that these firms 
also increase profit by reducing non-labor costs. Finally, as in Table 3, the effect of foreign 
ownership on financial leverage in Table 5 is negative and statistically significant for both the 
industrial and non-industrial foreign firms. 
In Table 6, we report the dynamic performance effects of the eight categories of SLOs. 
There are relatively few significant time-varying coefficients and they are almost all 
concentrated in the labor cost column. Thus domestic individual SLOs and both types of foreign 
SLOs display a U -shaped adjustment in labor cost over time, corresponding to Blanchard’s 
(1997) hypothesis. The only other effect is an inverted U effect of the domestic individual SLO 
on sales. 
  The estimates in Table 7 correspond to equation (7) and they examine whether the SLO 
effect depends on majority or minority ownership. As may be seen from the table, there are 
relatively few instances in which SLO’s majority or minority stakes play a part and the lack of 
significance is not brought about by collinearity. Foreign industrial SLOs tend to reduce the 
labor cost irrespective of the size of their stake, domestic investment funds, the state and foreign 
other SLOs do so when they have a majority stake, and domestic industrial company, individual 
owner, state, and other foreign SLOs do so when they have a blocking minority. Furthermore, 
the state as a majority SLO has a negative effect on profit, while a blocking minority by a 
domestic portfolio company and the state have negative effects on sales revenue and 
profitability. Finally, legal minority stakes by domestic portfolio company and the state both 
reduce sales revenue and the state also has a significant negative effect on profitability.
24 
                                                                 
24 Finally, we have also estimated equation (8), in which we allow the performance effects of SLOs to depend on 
both time and extent of ownership. This specification confirms a number of the previous findings, but it also 
weakens the significance of some of the earlier estimates and does not provide new insights. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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7. Concluding Observations 
Compared to other studies of the effect of ownership on performance, our analysis is of 
interest because we (a) have detailed information on the forms and concentration of ownership in 
a virtually complete population of medium and large firms privatized in a model large-scale 
privatization economy, (b) use a four-year panel of data that come from the post privatization 
period when one can observe medium-term effects corresponding to strategic restructuring, (c) 
have data conforming to the international accounting system, and (d) control systematically for 
potential sample selection bias. 
We use the detailed ownership data to estimate the performance effect of ownership 
along two important dimensions: (i) the degree of concentration of domestic private, foreign and 
state ownership, irrespective of the number of owners within each of these ownership categories 
and (ii) eight principal types of single largest owners (SLOs) and the concentration of ownership 
by these SLOs.  
Our empirical findings have several key implications. First, none of the categories of 
concentration of private domestic or foreign ownership generates an effect on the rate of change 
of sales revenue that differs from that of the majority or significant minority state-owned firms. 
These results hence lead one to reject the hypothesis that domestic and/or foreign private 
ownership, in moderate or greater concentrations, leads to more substantial strategic 
restructuring as reflected in increased sales. (The exception is majority foreign-owned firms in a 
more aggressively trimmed sample where we find a positive sales effect.) 
Second, private domestic and foreign majority and significant minority owners, as well as 
dispersed owners, increase profitability relative to majority and significant minority state-owned 
firms. The domestic private firms do so at least in part by reducing the rate of growth of labor 
cost, while the foreign firms, domestic private firms with small concentration and firms with William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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dispersed ownership presumably do so by reducing non-labor costs or generating income from 
other areas than sales revenues. Hence, rather than increasing profitability through greater sales, 
private domestic and foreign firms appear to do so through defensive restructuring (reducing 
labor and presumably also non-labor costs) and by generating income from other sources. 
Third, firms with dispersed ownership register higher positive effect on profit than firms 
with more concentrated ownership of any kind. This finding provides support to the theories 
arguing that factors such as stock market liquidity and managerial autonomy and initiative, rather 
than control of managers by strong shareholders or state, are important for firm performance. 
Fourth, the state through its retention of a golden share (ability to veto certain managerial 
decisions), as well as through its base effect as a majority shareholder, has a positive effect on 
the labor cost. The state hence displays a ‘social’ objective during the post privatization period 
when unemployment rose. 
Fifth, foreign owners with high as well as moderate extent of ownership uniformly reduce 
financial leverage, as do majority domestic owners. This implies that significant private domestic 
and foreign ownership results in a reduction of debt and/or infusion of equity capital and it may 
represent one of the avenues of increasing profitability in these firms. 
Sixth, the dynamic (time-varying-coefficient) estimates of the effects of ownership suffer 
from collinearity, but the effect on labor cost appears to be U -shaped, which supports a 
restructuring hypothesis advanced by Blanchard (1997) and others. 
Seventh, analyzing the effect of ownership through the eight types of single largest 
owners provides complementary results to those from the domestic private, foreign and state 
ownership categories. Single largest ownership by domestic and foreign industrial companies 
and domestic investment funds and individuals results in higher profits, while domestic bank and 
portfolio company ownership, or foreign ‘other’ ownership, do not. Banks and portfolio William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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companies as SLOs have therefore been incapable of carrying out profit-generating restructuring. 
The banks’ inability appears to be connected with the fact that the few  large banks suddenly 
found themselves holding significant ownership positions in hundreds of firms and were unable 
to staff the firms’ management and supervisory boards with capable individuals. Their ownership 
role was also complicated by laws and regulations that limited their rights. The portfolio 
companies in turn usually pursued short-term gains, which was often at odds with the task of 
carrying out strategic restructuring. 
Eighth, the positive profit effect of a foreign industrial company SLO is associated with a 
positive effect on sales and a reduction in financial leverage. These foreign SLOs hence carry out 
strategic restructuring in production  and financing without deviating from the state ownership 
benchmark in terms of the labor cost. 
Ninth, the effect of SLO by and large does not vary with the SLO’s concentration of 
ownership. This evidence goes against all the leading theories related to the effect of 
concentrated or dispersed ownership on performance. It suggests that for certain measures of 
ownership, such as the SLO, the extent of concentration or dispersion does not affect 
performance. 
Overall, our study shows that in the post-privatization period, private ownership tends to 
be associated with superior performance, relative to state ownership, in terms of some indicators 
but not in terms of others. Some forms of private ownership (e.g., banks and portfolio 
companies) are particularly ineffective in exceeding performance standards of state-owned 
companies. Our study also finds that dispersed ownership results in better or equal performance 
than more concentrated ownership forms, thus providing evidence for an important theoretical 
debate. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics: Growth Rates of Performance Measures 1996-1999 
             
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Num. 
Firms  Num.Obs 
Operating Profit  0.109  1.023  -2.995  2.998  1497  2529 
Sales  0.008  0.427  -1.000  2.820  1371  2592 
Labor Costs  0.010  0.364  -1.000  2.842  1539  2949 
Liability/ Equity  0.078  0.331  -0.812  2.885  1497  2883 
             
Number of firms differs from num ber of observations due to the panel structure.   
The ratio of the number of observations to number of firms varies due to an unbalanced nature of the 
panel. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics: Ownership Measures 
             
Panel A: Ownership by SLO 
Number of Observations 
Type of single largest 
owner (SLO) 
Num. 
of obs. 
Mean 
size of 
stake (%) 
Majority               
held by 
SLO 
Blocking 
Minority held 
by SLO 
Legal 
Minority 
Golden 
Share held 
by State 
Domestic Ownership             
   Industrial Co.  1102  45.87  441  363  283  31 
   Bank  53  42.57  19  10  22  2 
   Invest. Fund  493  30.79  68  97  317  26 
   Individual  311  35.58  66  82  159  16 
   Portfolio Co.  98  38.35  19  35  41  6 
   State  277  40.37  66  101  105  75 
Foreign Ownership             
   Industrial Co.  202  55.92  119  48  29  3 
   Others  56  45.77  18  20  17  1 
Total  2592  41.61  816  756  973  160 
             
             
Panel B: Grouped Ownership by Type 
Number of observations 
Type of aggregate 
ownership 
Num. 
of obs. 
Mean 
size of 
stake (%)  Majority 
Blocking 
Minority  
Legal 
Minority 
Golden 
Share held 
by State 
  Domestic  2057  40.26  613  587  822  81 
  Foreign  258  53.72  137  68  46  4 
  State  277  40.37  66  101  105  75 
Total  2592  41.61  816  756  973  160 
             
Note: Table contains basic ownership statistics associated with performance variable of sales.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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Operating 
Profit
Sales
Labor 
Cost
Liability/ 
Equity
Constant (Majority State) -0.707 1 0.051   0.089 10 -0.175 1
(0.186)   (0.084)   (0.051)   (0.036)  
Owner Type
   Majority Domestic 0.315
1 -0.074
  -0.061
10 -0.063
5
(0.115)   (0.059)   (0.032)   (0.028)  
   Majority Foreign 0.282 5 0.061   0.040   -0.145 1
(0.136)   (0.065)   (0.038)   (0.042)  
   Blocking Minority Domestic 0.268
5 -0.087
  -0.062
5 -0.045
 
(0.117)   (0.059)   (0.031)   (0.029)  
   Blocking Minority Foreign 0.367 5 -0.025   -0.007   -0.073 10
(0.161)   (0.070)   (0.037)   (0.039)  
   Blocking Minority State 0.134   -0.036   0.005   -0.047  
(0.127)   (0.060)   (0.031)   (0.030)  
   Legal Minority Domestic 0.243 5 -0.055   -0.033   -0.043  
(0.114)   (0.059)   (0.030)   (0.028)  
   Legal Minority Foreign -0.086   -0.070   0.035   -0.066 10
(0.168)   (0.073)   (0.055)   (0.037)  
   Legal Minority State 0.110   -0.054   0.014   -0.033  
(0.145)   (0.065)   (0.040)   (0.032)  
   Other than Majority or Minority 0.568 1 0.137   0.091   -0.023  
(0.158)   (0.117)   (0.057)   (0.039)  
Golden Share 0.044   0.007   0.053 1 0.005  
(0.093)   (0.023)   (0.019)   (0.016)  
Initial value -1.2E-08
  3.0E-10
  9.5E-09
  -1.9E-02
1
(2.1E-08)   (1.9E-09)   (7.3E-09)   (7.2E-03)  
First Wave 0.124   0.042   -0.079   0.182 1
(0.122)   (0.067)   (0.054)   (0.034)  
Second Wave 0.065
  0.056
  -0.104
10 0.134
1
(0.126)   (0.067)   (0.053)   (0.033)  
Both Waves 0.125   0.069   -0.081   0.168 1
(0.134)   (0.069)   (0.056)   (0.037)  
Inverse of Mills' Ratio 0.608
1 -0.030
5 -0.005
  0.407
1
(0.142)   (0.014)   (0.008)   (0.018)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 1, 5 and  
          10 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tail test, respectively.
          Industry, year, and privatization dummies included. All estimates are adjusted 
          for potential sample selection bias using the Heckman (1979) procedure.
Average Effects of Domestic Private, Foreign and State Ownership.
Table 3William Davidson Institute Working Paper 471 
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Operating 
Profit
Sales
Labor 
Cost
Liability/ 
Equity
Constant (Majority State) -0.203   0.101   -0.201   0.082  
(0.860)   (0.268)   (0.141)   (0.128)  
Owner Type
Majority Domestic -0.147   -0.244   0.034   -0.328 5
(0.898)   (0.282)   (0.176)   (0.141)  
Majority Foreign 0.948   0.205   0.536 5 -0.217  
(1.014)   (0.343)   (0.219)   (0.255)  
Blocking Minority Domestic -0.419   -0.200   0.298 10 -0.212  
(0.907)   (0.283)   (0.159)   (0.145)  
Blocking Minority Foreign -0.191   -0.091   0.204   -0.073  
(1.286)   (0.379)   (0.199)   (0.233)  
Blocking Minority State 0.189   0.179   0.161   -0.227  
(1.045)   (0.282)   (0.168)   (0.162)  
Legal Minority Domestic -0.252   -0.254   0.184   -0.253 10
(0.885)   (0.279)   (0.154)   (0.136)  
Legal Minority Foreign 2.291 5 0.355   0.780 1 -0.321  
(1.163)   (0.395)   (0.296)   (0.219)  
Legal Minority State 1.091   0.045   -0.142   -0.253 10
(1.086)   (0.309)   (0.294)   (0.151)  
Other than Majority or Minority -0.393   0.486   0.230   -0.443 10
(1.190)   (1.098)   (0.386)   (0.231)  
Golden Share -1.076 10 -0.064   0.297 5 -0.159 10
(0.586)   (0.128)   (0.121)   (0.095)  
Time
Majority Domestic 0.561   0.157   -0.137   0.284 10
(1.143)   (0.287)   (0.192)   (0.161)  
Majority Foreign -0.715   -0.175   -0.573 5 0.048  
(1.270)   (0.376)   (0.245)   (0.284)  
Blocking Minority Domestic 0.936   0.099   -0.421 5 0.174  
(1.156)   (0.294)   (0.172)   (0.166)  
Blocking Minority Foreign 0.738   0.091   -0.230   -0.009  
(1.480)   (0.431)   (0.226)   (0.273)  
Blocking Minority State 0.112   -0.292   -0.165   0.162  
(1.045)   (0.282)   (0.168)   (0.162)  
Legal Minority Domestic 0.643   0.208   -0.288 10 0.267 10
(1.132)   (0.293)   (0.168)   (0.157)  
Legal Minority Foreign -2.530 10 -0.554   -1.002 1 0.297  
(1.465)   (0.442)   (0.382)   (0.274)  
Legal Minority State -1.386   -0.170   0.205   0.251  
(1.371)   (0.328)   (0.373)   (0.167)  
Other than Majority or Minority 1.169   -0.617   -0.191   0.468 10
(1.505)   (1.522)   (0.469)   (0.279)  
Golden Share 1.420 5 0.020   -0.316 5 0.183 10
(0.692)   (0.157)   (0.155)   (0.109)  
Base (Majority State) -0.650   0.007   0.380 1 -0.285 5
(1.092)   (0.258)   (0.139)   (0.143)  
Dynamic Effects of Domestic Private, Foreign and State Ownership.
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Operating 
Profit Sales
Labor 
Cost
Liability/ 
Equity
Time Square
Majority Domestic -0.142   -0.021   0.038   -0.058  
(0.292)   (0.072)   (0.047)   (0.043)  
Majority Foreign 0.163   0.054   0.138 5 0.003  
(0.324)   (0.094)   (0.059)   (0.071)  
Blocking Minority Domestic -0.265   -0.008   0.102 5 -0.031  
(0.296)   (0.075)   (0.042)   (0.045)  
Blocking Minority Foreign -0.203   -0.016   0.052   0.012  
(0.365)   (0.108)   (0.058)   (0.069)  
Blocking Minority State -0.090   0.088   0.030   -0.016  
(0.381)   (0.073)   (0.050)   (0.057)  
Legal Minority Domestic -0.173   -0.038   0.078 10 -0.066  
(0.290)   (0.075)   (0.042)   (0.043)  
Legal Minority Foreign 0.579   0.159   0.276 1 -0.066  
(0.378)   (0.110)   (0.107)   (0.071)  
Legal Minority State 0.430   0.065   -0.057   -0.055  
(0.348)   (0.082)   (0.094)   (0.044)  
Other than Majority or Minority -0.298   0.224   0.053   -0.103  
(0.393)   (0.484)   (0.127)   (0.072)  
Golden Share -0.379 5 0.013   0.085 5 -0.042  
(0.182)   (0.044)   (0.042)   (0.030)  
Base (Majority State) 0.151   -0.033   -0.109 1 0.056  
(0.278)   (0.065)   (0.033)   (0.039)  
Initial value -1.0E-08   1.1E-09   1.3E-08 10 -1.9E-02 1
(2.2E-08)   (1.9E-09)   (7.7E-09)   (7.1E-03)  
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave 0.114   0.039   -0.075   0.176 1
(0.122)   (0.067)   (0.053)   (0.033)  
Second Wave 0.057   0.054   -0.101 10 0.128 1
(0.126)   (0.067)   (0.053)   (0.033)  
Both Waves 0.115   0.065   -0.076   0.159 1
(0.133)   (0.070)   (0.056)   (0.037)  
0.622 1 -0.030 5 -0.006   0.407 1
(0.141)   (0.014)   (0.008)   (0.018)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 1, 5 and 10 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tail test, respectively. Industry, year, and 
privatization dummies included. All estimates are adjusted for potential sample selection 
bias using the Heckman (1979) procedure.
Inverse of Mills' Ratio
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Operating 
Profit
  Sales   Labor 
Cost
  Liability/ 
Equity
 
Constant (State) -0.587 1 0.025   0.105 5 -0.198 1
(0.166)   (0.073)   (0.050)   (0.032)  
Domestic Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.172
5 -0.048
10 -0.069
1 -0.016
 
(0.068)   (0.026)   (0.020)   (0.014)  
Bank 0.072   0.008   0.021   -0.062  
(0.129)   (0.072)   (0.051)   (0.042)  
Invest. Fund 0.167 5 -0.025   -0.096 1 -0.020  
(0.078)   (0.030)   (0.022)   (0.015)  
Individual 0.196 5 0.000   -0.040   -0.031 10
(0.086)   (0.036)   (0.028)   (0.018)  
Portfolio Co. 0.120   -0.042   -0.007   -0.028  
(0.128)   (0.054)   (0.051)   (0.029)  
Foreign Ownership
Industrial Co. 0.171 10 0.066 5 0.026   -0.083 1
(0.090)   (0.033)   (0.024)   (0.028)  
Others -0.013   -0.021   -0.052   -0.066 1
(0.143)   (0.062)   (0.047)   (0.025)  
Initial value -2.0E-08
  1.2E-09
  1.1E-08
  -2.0E-02
1
(2.1E-08)   (1.7E-09)   (7.6E-09)   (7.4E-03)  
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave 0.119
  0.031
  -0.080
  0.183
1
(0.123)   (0.066)   (0.053)   (0.033)  
Second Wave 0.065
  0.047
  -0.101
10 0.132
1
(0.126)   (0.066)   (0.053)   (0.033)  
Both Waves 0.126
  0.058
  -0.072
  0.171
1
(0.135)   (0.068)   (0.056)   (0.037)  
0.601
1 -0.030
5 -0.006
  0.408
1
(0.147)   (0.014)   (0.008)   (0.018)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. 1, 5 and 10 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,  two-tail test, 
respectively. Industry, year, and privatization dummies included. All 
estimates are adjusted for potential sample selection bias using the Heckman 
(1979) procedure.
Effects of Single Largest Owner (SLO) on Performance
Table 5
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Operating 
Profit
  Sales
  Labor 
Cost
  Liability/ 
Equity
 
Constant (State) -0.224
  0.126
  -0.141
  -0.148
5
(0.478)   (0.134)   (0.114)   (0.071)  
Owner Type
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.159   -0.224   0.087   -0.007  
(0.493)   (0.143)   (0.125)   (0.080)  
   Bank -0.736
  -0.986
  0.177
  -0.221
 
(0.699)   (0.819)   (0.391)   (0.230)  
   Invest. Fund -0.189
  -0.119
  0.124
  -0.120
 
(0.553)   (0.169)   (0.142)   (0.093)  
   Individual -0.612   -0.551 5 0.270   0.116  
(0.606)   (0.236)   (0.188)   (0.117)  
   Portfolio Co. 0.165   0.047   -0.319   -0.164  
(0.850)   (0.301)   (0.419)   (0.173)  
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. 0.787   0.294   0.395 5 0.026  
(0.632)   (0.196)   (0.156)   (0.184)  
   Others 1.224   -0.593   0.603 5 -0.189  
(1.011)   (0.419)   (0.293)   (0.167)  
Time
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. 0.362
  0.171
  -0.209
  0.010
 
(0.647)   (0.163)   (0.156)   (0.098)  
   Bank 1.027
  1.356
  -0.199
  0.135
 
(0.828)   (1.069)   (0.489)   (0.260)  
   Invest. Fund 0.468   0.154   -0.271   0.138  
(0.715)   (0.195)   (0.175)   (0.115)  
   Individual 0.935   0.620 5 -0.432 10 -0.166  
(0.769)   (0.291)   (0.231)   (0.144)  
   Portfolio Co. -0.080
  -0.064
  0.254
  0.145
 
(1.041)   (0.323)   (0.546)   (0.182)  
   Base -0.401
  -0.086
  0.346
5 -0.071
 
(0.591)   (0.127)   (0.136)   (0.080)  
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.712
  -0.234
  -0.447
5 -0.143
 
(0.790)   (0.232)   (0.190)   (0.207)  
   Others -1.347
  0.650
  -0.844
5 0.156
 
(1.196)   (0.505)   (0.371)   (0.208)  
Dynamic Effects of SLO
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Operating 
Profit
  Sales
  Labor 
Cost
  Liability/ 
Equity
 
Time Square
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.078
  -0.029
  0.061
  -0.010
 
(0.187)   (0.044)   (0.040)   (0.028)  
   Bank -0.264   -0.382   0.054   -0.011  
(0.233)   (0.284)   (0.123)   (0.067)  
   Invest. Fund -0.125   -0.046   0.072   -0.042  
(0.203)   (0.052)   (0.046)   (0.032)  
   Individual -0.226   -0.144 10 0.128 5 0.038  
(0.217)   (0.080)   (0.060)   (0.040)  
   Portfolio Co. 0.030
  0.005
  -0.026
  -0.032
 
(0.293)   (0.081)   (0.144)   (0.045)  
   Base 0.070
  0.003
  -0.109
1 0.016
 
(0.174)   (0.034)   (0.035)   (0.024)  
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. 0.183
  0.055
  0.118
5 0.037
 
(0.218)   (0.060)   (0.048)   (0.051)  
   Others 0.313   -0.154   0.229 5 -0.044  
(0.315)   (0.126)   (0.101)   (0.056)  
Initial value -1.9E-08
  1.4E-09
  1.5E-08
10 -1.9E-02
1
(2.1E-08)   (1.7E-09)   (7.9E-09)   (7.2E-03)  
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave 0.106
  0.024
  -0.078
  0.185
1
(0.123)   (0.066)   (0.053)   (0.033)  
Second Wave 0.057   0.044   -0.099 10 0.134 1
(0.126)   (0.066)   (0.053)   (0.032)  
Both Waves 0.114   0.054   -0.069   0.173 1
(0.135)   (0.069)   (0.056)   (0.037)  
Inverse of Mills' Ratio 0.597
1 -0.030
5 -0.006
  0.408
1
(0.151)   (0.014)   (0.008)   (0.018)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. 1, 5 and 10 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tail test, 
respectively. Industry, year, and privatization dummies included. SLO stands 
for the single largest owner. All estimates are adjusted for potential sample 
selection bias using the Heckman (1979) procedure.
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Operating 
Profit
  Sales
  Labor 
Cost
  Liability/ 
Equity
 
Constant (State) -0.198
  0.125
  0.164
5 -0.127
5
(0.217)   (0.095)   (0.065)   (0.054)  
Owner Type
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. 0.081
  -0.038
  0.051
  -0.038
 
(0.280)   (0.157)   (0.122)   (0.073)  
   Bank -0.153
  1.192
  -0.152
  -0.054
 
(0.323)   (1.104)   (0.106)   (0.085)  
   Invest. Fund 0.038   -0.075   -0.077   -0.113 10
(0.296)   (0.256)   (0.112)   (0.066)  
   Individual 0.463   0.691   -0.001   -0.027  
(0.483)   (0.583)   (0.095)   (0.060)  
   Portfolio Co. -0.059   -0.030   0.372   -0.122  
(0.287)   (0.068)   (0.326)   (0.075)  
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.211   -0.010   -0.097 10 0.003  
(0.353)   (0.081)   (0.058)   (0.112)  
   Others -0.168   -0.048   0.170   -0.246 1
(0.271)   (0.081)   (0.136)   (0.092)  
Golden Share 0.056   0.013   0.053 1 0.002  
(0.093)   (0.024)   (0.019)   (0.017)  
Majority
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.300   -0.128   -0.195 10 -0.060  
(0.238)   (0.143)   (0.116)   (0.059)  
   Bank 0.155   -1.187   0.111   -0.078  
(0.308)   (1.111)   (0.109)   (0.075)  
   Invest. Fund -0.346   -0.071   -0.204 10 -0.010  
(0.276)   (0.252)   (0.116)   (0.059)  
   Individual -0.628
  -0.833
  -0.091
  -0.106
5
(0.470)   (0.582)   (0.103)   (0.048)  
   Portfolio Co. 0.063
  0.188
  -0.383
  0.029
 
(0.308)   (0.181)   (0.346)   (0.065)  
   State -0.519 1 -0.072   -0.086 10 -0.042  
(0.192)   (0.083)   (0.050)   (0.053)  
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.031
  0.006
  0.069
  -0.192
10
(0.323)   (0.061)   (0.048)   (0.111)  
   Others -0.055   -0.022   -0.320 5 0.060  
(0.346)   (0.111)   (0.150)   (0.087)  
Effects of SLO Having Majority or Minority Share Ownership
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Operating 
Profit
  Sales   Labor 
Cost
  Liability/ 
Equity
 
Blocking Minority
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.308
  -0.123
  -0.198
10 -0.039
 
(0.238)   (0.144)   (0.115)   (0.059)  
   Bank -0.526   -1.339   0.160   -0.184  
(0.327)   (1.108)   (0.137)   (0.197)  
   Invest. Fund -0.243   -0.064   -0.075   0.000  
(0.274)   (0.251)   (0.107)   (0.056)  
   Individual -0.630   -0.845   -0.184 5 -0.058  
(0.468)   (0.582)   (0.089)   (0.047)  
   Portfolio Co. -0.618
10 -0.180
1 -0.462
  0.046
 
(0.327)   (0.052)   (0.333)   (0.074)  
   State -0.387 5 -0.112   -0.083 10 -0.088 10
(0.180)   (0.071)   (0.046)   (0.047)  
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. 0.199
  -0.071
  0.050
  -0.134
 
(0.343)   (0.059)   (0.043)   (0.111)  
   Others -0.306
  -0.091
  -0.360
1 0.167
5
(0.300)   (0.124)   (0.140)   (0.082)  
Legal Minority
Domestic Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.370
  -0.091
  -0.169
  -0.044
 
(0.240)   (0.144)   (0.116)   (0.059)  
   Bank -0.364   -1.421   0.074   -0.029  
(0.330)   (1.105)   (0.133)   (0.087)  
   Invest. Fund -0.287   -0.052   -0.064   0.036  
(0.255)   (0.248)   (0.105)   (0.048)  
   Individual -0.740   -0.778   -0.071   -0.074 10
(0.462)   (0.581)   (0.092)   (0.045)  
   Portfolio Co. -0.167
  -0.213
1 -0.497
  0.004
 
(0.288)   (0.061)   (0.330)   (0.079)  
   State -0.408 5 -0.131 10 -0.070   -0.074  
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Operating 
Profit
  Sales   Labor 
Cost
  Liability/ 
Equity
 
Foreign Ownership
   Industrial Co. -0.423
  -0.097
  0.028
  -0.105
 
(0.357)   (0.071)   (0.057)   (0.105)  
   Others -0.419
  -0.123
  -0.190
  0.129
 
(0.295)   (0.090)   (0.164)   (0.096)  
Initial value 0.0E+00   0.0E+00   0.0E+00   0.0E+00 1
(2.2E-08)   (1.9E-09)   (7.4E-09)   (7.1E-03)  
Voucher-Privatization Dummies
First Wave 0.129   0.033   -0.073   0.182 1
(0.123)   (0.067)   (0.054)   (0.033)  
Second Wave 0.068
  0.051
  -0.095
10 0.134
1
(0.126)   (0.067)   (0.054)   (0.032)  
Both Waves 0.131   0.062   -0.070   0.168 1
(0.135)   (0.069)   (0.057)   (0.036)  
Inverse of Mills' Ratio 0.612 1 -0.033 5 -0.006   0.409 1
(0.137)   (0.014)   (0.007)   (0.018)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. 1, 5 and 10 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tail test, 
respectively. Industry, year, and privatization dummies included. SLO stands 
for the single largest owner. All estimates are adjusted for potential sample 
selection bias using the Heckman (1979) procedure.
Table 7 (continued)
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